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Book	Review:	Coalition	Strategy	and	the	End	of	the
First	World	War:	The	Supreme	War	Council	and	War
Planning,	1917-1918	by	Meighen	McCrae
In	Coalition	Strategy	and	the	End	of	the	First	World	War,	Meighen	McCrae	explores	the	role	of	the	Supreme
War	Council	as	a	coalition	organ	for	inter-Allied	strategic	cooperation	between	1917	and	1918.	As	the	book
encourages	readers	to	consider	the	1914-18	conflict	from	a	global	perspective	and	widens	understanding	of	the
coalition	strategic	planning	timeline,	this	is	a	welcome	addition	to	the	Entente	scholarship	that	will	be	of	interest	to
anyone	studying	the	nature	of	coalition	warfare	in	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries,	writes	Sofya	Anisimova.
Coalition	Strategy	and	the	End	of	the	First	World	War:	The	Supreme	War	Council	and	War	Planning,	1917-
1918.	Meighen	McCrae.	Cambridge	University	Press.	2019.	https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566711.
The	First	World	War	today	is	widely	recognised	as	the	‘war	of	coalitions’:	those	of	the
Entente	and	the	Central	Powers.	However,	studies	that	examine	the	coalitions’
strategic	planning,	especially	of	the	Entente,	are	rare	as	they	usually	require
knowledge	of	at	least	two	languages	and	travel	to	archives	located	in	various	countries.
Based	on	sources	from	various	British,	French	and	American	archives,	Meighen
McCrae’s	book,	Coalition	Strategy	and	the	End	of	the	First	World	War,	is	a	welcome
addition	to	the	Entente	scholarship	that	not	only	encourages	us	to	consider	the	1914-
18	war	from	a	global	perspective,	but	also	to	widen	our	understanding	of	the	coalition
strategic	planning	timeline:	namely,	that	in	1918,	the	Entente	decision-makers	were
preparing	for	the	war	in	1919.
The	study	revolves	around	the	Supreme	War	Council	(SWC)	–	a	coalition	organ,
created	in	late	1917,	which	consisted	of	two	representatives	of	Britain,	France	and
Italy:	a	government	leader	and	another	government	member.	As	an	associated	power
to	the	Entente,	the	United	States	refused	to	take	part	in	a	political	committee	and	was
represented	by	the	American	ambassador	to	France	who	had	merely	observational
functions.	However,	Americans	took	an	active	part	in	the	Military	Council,	made	up	of
the	permanent	military	representatives	(PMRs)	of	the	Allied	Armies.	As	professional	staff	officers,	the	PMRs	were
supposed	to	advise	political	leaders	of	the	coalition	on	matters	of	military	strategy.
The	SWC	inherited	many	flaws	of	previous	inter-Allied	institutions,	such	as	inter-Allied	conferences,	munitions
committees	and	economic	agencies.	It	suffered	from	excessive	bureaucratisation,	a	lack	of	executive	power	that
would	ensure	compliance	of	all	the	coalition	members	with	its	decisions	and	an	inability	to	fully	mitigate	the	conflict
between	national	interests	and	those	of	the	coalition.	Nevertheless,	McCrae	argues	that	over	1918,	the	SWC
evolved	into	an	effective	platform	of	inter-Allied	strategic	cooperation.	Despite	its	limitations,	the	SWC	facilitated	the
communication	between	military	and	political	leaders	of	the	Entente.	It	helped	coalition	members	to	reach	an
agreement	that	future	victory	could	be	reached	only	on	the	Franco-Belgian	front,	and	to	concentrate	their	efforts
there.
Moreover,	the	existence	of	a	coalition	body	that	allowed	discussion	of	strategic	plans	was	beneficial	for	all	members
of	the	Entente	regarding	their	military	importance.	Italy	was	considered	to	be	a	junior	member	of	the	coalition,	but
thanks	to	the	SWC,	it	acquired	a	platform	where	it	could	voice	its	concerns	and	demand	assistance.	It	eventually
received	enough	support	to	resist	Austria-Hungary	and	stay	in	the	war,	whilst	other	Allied	powers	concentrated	on
the	Western	Front.
The	PMRs	were,	in	fact,	the	only	inter-Allied	body	that	was	considering	the	strategy	of	the	Entente	from	a	global
perspective	as	opposed	to	the	headquarters	of	the	various	Allied	Armies	that	were	developing	their	own	national
strategies.	In	the	Joint	Note	37,	examined	in	detail	throughout	the	book,	the	PMRs	outlined	the	Allied	strategic
policy	for	the	coming	year	and	stressed	the	importance	of	the	secondary	theatres,	such	as	the	Macedonian,	Middle
Eastern	and	Italian	fronts,	in	relation	to	the	Franco-Belgian	front	and	the	fight	against	Germany.
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However,	the	notes	submitted	by	the	PMRs	to	the	SWC	had	only	an	advisory	nature.	McCrae	argues	that	outside
the	Franco-Belgian	theatre,	effective	unified	strategic	policy	was	created	by	the	SWC	only	when	the	national
interests	of	the	Allies	coincided.	In	September	1918	the	PMRs	quickly	agreed	that	offensive	action	in	the	Middle
East	must	be	postponed	in	order	to	concentrate	resources	in	France.	But	at	the	same	time,	they	failed	to	develop	a
unified	plan	of	action	in	the	Balkans	and	had	to	rely	on	France,	which	was	the	dominant	power	on	this	front.
The	PMRs	also	easily	reached	an	agreement	about	the	primacy	of	the	Franco-Belgian	front	in	Allied	strategy,	which
informed	the	actions	of	different	Allied	headquarters.	But	at	the	same	time,	they	significantly	underestimated	the
strength	of	the	German	Army	and	deferred	the	Allied	offensive	to	the	summer	of	1919.	Preparing	for	the	decisive
battle	in	1919,	the	SWC	and	its	military	advisers	were	not	ready	to	provide	guidance	for	the	future	peace
settlement.	It	is,	McCrae	argues,	one	of	the	reasons	why	the	legacy	of	the	SWC	was	soon	forgotten	after	the	war:	it
was	not	prepared	for	the	peace	negotiations	in	1918	and	it	did	not	have	enough	time	to	demonstrate	its	advantages
in	times	of	war.
Coalition	Strategy	and	the	End	of	the	First	World	War	continues	the	study	of	the	Entente	strategy	that	began	in	the
1980s	with	the	works	of	David	French,	later	continued	by	Elisabeth	Greenhalgh	and	William	Philpott.	It	expands	the
study	of	coalition	strategy	to	cover	the	Allies’	strategic	planning	for	and	into	the	year	of	1919,	and	it	answers	the
question	not	of	‘how	the	war	was	won’,	but	rather	‘how	the	Allies	were	planning	to	win	it’.	Moreover,	McCrae
solidifies	the	framework	of	coalition	strategy	analysis	that	includes	both	coalition	institutions	and	the	strategic	policy
created	by	them,	paving	the	way	for	future	Entente	strategy	research.	Focusing	on	the	four	major	Entente	powers,	it
offers	valuable	insight	on	the	balance	of	power	in	the	coalition	of	1918,	the	weight	of	the	United	States	and	the	role
of	the	Italian	front	in	the	coalition	planning.	A	more	detailed	assessment	of	coalition	from	the	perspective	of	the
Italian	high	command	would	be	a	good	addition	to	this	study,	but	as	French	conceded	in	2007,	to	delve	into	the
archives	of	multiple	coalition	countries	would	be	‘a	task	not	for	one	person,	but	for	a	small	team	of	scholars’.
The	First	World	War	opened	a	new	chapter	in	the	history	of	modern	warfare,	not	only	in	the	field	of	military
technologies,	but	also	in	coalition	management.	The	short-lived	Anglo-French	Supreme	War	Council	of	the	Second
World	War	was	drawn	up	on	the	blueprint	of	the	SWC;	even	the	experience	of	the	coalition	forces	in	Afghanistan	in
2001-14,	which	at	one	point	included	troops	of	more	than	30	countries,	shares	resemblance	to	that	of	the	Entente	in
1917-18.	International	coalitions	are	hard	to	manage,	but	they	are	also	challenging	to	study.	Meighen	McCrae’s
book	brings	us	one	step	closer	to	a	better	understanding	of	how	they	operate	and	would	be	of	interest	to	anyone
studying	the	nature	of	coalition	warfare	in	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	centuries.
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Note:	This	article	is	provided	by	our	sister	site,	LSE	Review	of	Books.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the
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